FPGA-accelerated Key Search for Cold-Boot Attacks against AES (bibtex)
by Heinrich Riebler, Tobias Kenter, Christoph Sorge and Christian Plessl
Abstract:
Cold-boot attacks exploit the fact that DRAM contents are not immediately lost when a PC is powered off. Instead the contents decay rather slowly, in particular if the DRAM chips are cooled to low temperatures. This effect opens an attack vector on cryptographic applications that keep decrypted keys in DRAM. An attacker with access to the target computer can reboot it or remove the RAM modules and quickly copy the RAM contents to non-volatile memory. By exploiting the known cryptographic structure of the cipher and layout of the key data in memory, in our application an AES key schedule with redundancy, the resulting memory image can be searched for sections that could correspond to decayed cryptographic keys; then, the attacker can attempt to reconstruct the original key. However, the runtime of these algorithms grows rapidly with increasing memory image size, error rate and complexity of the bit error model, which limits the practicability of the approach.In this work, we study how the algorithm for key search can be accelerated with custom computing machines. We present an FPGA-based architecture on a Maxeler dataflow computing system that outperforms a software implementation up to 205x, which significantly improves the practicability of cold-attacks against AES.
Reference:
Heinrich Riebler, Tobias Kenter, Christoph Sorge and Christian Plessl: FPGA-accelerated Key Search for Cold-Boot Attacks against AES, In Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Field-Programmable Technology, FPT 2013, Kyoto, Japan, December 9-11, 2013, pp. 386–389, 2013.
Bibtex Entry:
@InProceedings{	  riebler2013coldboot,
  title		= {{FPGA-accelerated Key Search for Cold-Boot Attacks against
		  AES}},
  author	= {Heinrich Riebler AND Tobias Kenter AND Christoph Sorge AND
		  Christian Plessl},
  booktitle	= {{Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on
		  Field-Programmable Technology, FPT 2013, Kyoto, Japan,
		  December 9-11, 2013}},
  year		= {2013},
  pages		= {386--389},
  abstract	= {Cold-boot attacks exploit the fact that DRAM contents are
		  not immediately lost when a PC is powered off. Instead the
		  contents decay rather slowly, in particular if the DRAM
		  chips are cooled to low temperatures. This effect opens an
		  attack vector on cryptographic applications that keep
		  decrypted keys in DRAM. An attacker with access to the
		  target computer can reboot it or remove the RAM modules and
		  quickly copy the RAM contents to non-volatile memory. By
		  exploiting the known cryptographic structure of the cipher
		  and layout of the key data in memory, in our application an
		  AES key schedule with redundancy, the resulting memory
		  image can be searched for sections that could correspond to
		  decayed cryptographic keys; then, the attacker can attempt
		  to reconstruct the original key. However, the runtime of
		  these algorithms grows rapidly with increasing memory image
		  size, error rate and complexity of the bit error model,
		  which limits the practicability of the approach.In this
		  work, we study how the algorithm for key search can be
		  accelerated with custom computing machines. We present an
		  FPGA-based architecture on a Maxeler dataflow computing
		  system that outperforms a software implementation up to
		  205x, which significantly improves the practicability of
		  cold-attacks against AES.}
}
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